CSM - Change dual access control options

CSM has delivered an SGC Dual Control solution, as well as providing a way to define who can do what at a more granular level. I believe that these two features cover the primary use cases and I haven't heard any additional input. Marking this request a delivered per the above changes. If there are specific use cases that aren't covered, please comment or create a new IDEA with the specific scenario.

Hmmm...I could possibly see this for say Session Operators. As session operators wouldn't have the ability to issue commands against other aspects of the server which might cause issues. Would it work for you to have Dual Control "options" for session Operators? Then an option to enable/disable Dual Control at the admin level as well?

What's your use case though for allowing someone to create a backup without dual control? Most customers will setup a scheduled task to create the backups, so Dual control at a backup creation level isn't necessary. Also, I should note that allowing someone to create backups without Dual Control itself could be problematic. They could corrupt the data and then create backup after backup until the last good backup rolls off.

I believe the request from the initial requester was discussed with them through the iSeries toolkit team. However, I see a number of customers continue to vote for this work item. If you have voted for this work item, can you please provide specific use case information, so that we can be sure that we implement a solution that meets your needs without compromising security. If necessary you can send an email directly to blead@us.ibm.com to further discuss your requirements. At this point, we still do not have enough detail to come up with a design in order to implement this request.

Please provided other use cases other than create/delete. The problem with create/delete is that if you only enable dual control for those on "certain groups" that means the other groups can create/delete whatever they want...including the ones that were created by the control group. This is not very secure. In addition, if you only some users to manage SGC but others to manage FC or MM, the problem there is that while the FC users can't create a SGC session, they can use the same volumes as those in the SGC session, which would allow a malicious user to either prevent a backup or worse overwrite data. This as well isn't very secure.

CSM decided on an all or nothing policy to avoid these "holes" that would definite the purpose of having a dual control environment. If you feel there are use cases that won't cause "holes" please help us define these more clearly so that we can look at possible implementations.