V7000 Security Vulnerabilities related to DISA STIG findings

SPAWAR engineering component for the Dept of the Navy is considering the IBM V7000 for several Navy programs storage requirements. All systems/devices that are to be considered for procurement need to go through Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs) and the NSA Guides security audits, these are the configuration standards for DoD IA and IA-enabled devices/systems.
SPAWAR engineering recently completed an initial security audit of the V7000 system (some more automated scans to be done later, but these are all the manual checks(focus on CAT2), each listed below (along with the CAT severity of the finding):

1. (CAT 3 finding) The cryptographic module used by the V7000 is not on the FIPS 140-2 approved list. We were wondering if it is using one of the other listed IBM modules (since IBM has a lot of them on there).
2. (CAT 3 finding) The system does not seem to log access attempts (failed or successful) at all. It logs, in the Audit Log, the actions taken, but nothing regarding access attempts. Am I just missing this log, or is this accurate?
3. (Two CAT 2 findings) The system does not appear to allow for the creation of a DoD Login Banner for the GUI, nor for the CLI.
4. (Three CAT 2 findings) Timeouts (to the GUI, CLI and for TCP connections in general) are not configurable, and do not seem to be set at all. We need this set to 10 minutes for the GUI, 60 seconds for SSH, and to be able to drop TCP half-open connections (via a TCP timeout or other mechanism).
5. (CAT 2) NTP does not support authentication
6. (CAT 2) The system allows for 6 failed connection attempts before dropping the connection. This needs to be configurable to 3.
7. (CAT 3) The system does not allow for multiple NTP servers
8. (CAT 2) The management interface does not have an ACL to restrict allowed IPs (GUI or SSH)

Please note that SPAWAR cannot field any systems with unmitigated CAT 2 findings at all, so we would really need to have these addressed or at least find some form of mitigation (preferably the former).